![]() Large violent and confused seas were forecast for the area off Cape Hatteras. 3 cargo tank within the next few hours, the ship would be driven further onto the shoal and break up as the force of winds and waves increase with the approach of the storm. The salvage master and the USCG strike team had been placed onboard by helicopter.Īt about this time, the class society naval architects and the owner's technical staff reached the conclusion that unless 2,000 tons were pumped overboard from No. The wind was from the east-northeast at 25 knots and increasing. 3 Tank would enable the vessel to back off the shoal under her own power.įour hours after the vessel grounded, the center of the hurricane was 250 miles away and still heading west at a speed of 12 knots. It was determined that discharging 2,000 tons of cargo from No. To refloat, displacement must be reduced to allow the vessel to rise bodily. Based on data in their files and sounding information from the captain, the owner's technical experts and the class society naval architects calculated that the vessel could not be refloated by internal transfer of cargo. This was the shortest time in which a lightering vessel or a tug could be on scene. It transpired that it would take 16 hours to get a tug and barge to arrive from Norfolk to offload cargo from the stranded vessel. The Coast Guard strike team was dispatched, a salvor was engaged, the owner dispatched technical experts from his shore staff while at the same time placing his classification society on standby to make stress calculations, should this be required. Measures to provide assistance were immediately put in hand. The captain promptly notified the United States Coast Guard, the owner, and his agents in Philadelphia of the situation. Planned and actual tracks of the ship and the hurricane and the area where the ship grounded. The wind by this time was in the northeast at 20 knots, and the center of the hurricane was still some 300 miles away to the east. The power plant was not damaged, and the captain tried unsuccessfully to back the ship off using her engine. The shoal is soft sand, and although the bottom plating may have been set up, there were no leaks. The ship ran onto the shoal at 15 knots and came to rest with 80 percent of her length resting on the sand. This was followed by more human errors when the officer of the watch failed to observe that the ship was straying from her set track, and again when he failed to notice that Diamond Shoal light and the R2 buoy were on the wrong side of the ship. Shortly after course was changed to pass closer to Cape Hatteras, the gyro compass developed a mechanical problem, which resulted in the ship steering to the west of her set course. This was unnecessary and based on emotion, but nevertheless he did it. He made the first human error in our story by deciding to increase his distance from the hurricane by setting his course closer to Cape Hatteras than he normally would have done. The captain decided to continue his voyage to the Delaware, expecting to pass 350 miles ahead of the hurricane. It was expected to cross the coast near Wilmington, North Carolina. ![]() The storm was guided by a very large and stable ridge of high pressure stretching from Tennessee, through Ohio, northeast to Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. The captain had been plotting the track of a hurricane which was centered about 430 miles away, just ahead of the starboard beam and heading west at 12 knots. The ship is at a draft of 40 feet and making a speed of 15 knots. It is almost always the cumulative effect of a series of unique events which finally trigger a disaster.Īn 80,000-ton tanker is enroute from Mexico to a refinery on the Delaware River with a cargo of 78,500 tons of Isthmus crude oil. I should point out, however, that 80 percent of accidents can be traced to human error and are seldom due to a single factor. The possibility of the particular set of circumstances described in our story coming together like this is very remote. I rather like sea stories, but not this one. To focus on the question of whether to deliberately discharge a relatively small quantity of oil into the environment, and by so doing to avoid the eventual release of a much larger quantity, I developed the following horror story. The problem arises when the ship happens to be a loaded oil tanker and there is no time to obtain another vessel to receive the cargo. I think it true to say that no one with any knowledge of ships and Archimedes' principle would question that one way, and often the only way, to float a stranded ship is to make her lighter by removing some of the cargo. D ECISION F RAMEWORK : A S CENARIO FOR D ECIDING W HETHER TO J ETTISON C ARGO
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